This paper is concerned with a leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information, where the information available to the follower is based on some sub-σ-algebra of that available to the leader. Such kind of game problem has wide applications in finance, economics and management engineering such as newsvendor problems, cooperative advertising and pricing problems. Stochastic maximum principles and verification theorems with partial information are obtained, to represent the Stackelberg equilibrium. As applications, a linear-quadratic leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information is studied. It is shown that the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium admits a state feedback representation if some system of Riccati equations is solvable.
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superscripts denotes the transpose of a matrix. f x , f xx denote the partial derivative and twice partial derivative with respect to x for a differentiable function f .
Motivation
First, we present two examples which motivate us to study leader-follower stochastic differential games with asymmetric information in this paper.
Example 1.1: (Continuous Time Newsvendor Problem)
Let D(·) be the demand rate for some product in a market, which satisfies the stochastic differential equation (SDE) dD(t) = a(µ − D(t))dt + σdW (t) + σ W (t),
where a, µ, σ, σ are constants. We consider the market consisting of a manufacturer selling the product to end users through a retailer. At time t, the retailer chooses an order rate q(t) for the product and decides its retail price R(t), and is offered a wholesale price w(t) by the manufacturer. We assume that items can be salvaged at unit price S ≥ 0, and that items cannot be stored, i.e., they must be sold instantly or salvaged.
The retailer will obtain an expected profit J 1 q(·), R(·), w(·) = E − (w(t) − S)q(t) dt.
When the manufacturer has a fixed production cost per unit M ≥ 0, he will get an expected profit J 2 q(·), R(·), w(·) = E T 0 (w(t) − M )q(t)dt.
Let F t denote the σ-algebra generated by Brownian motions W (s), W (s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t. Intuitively F t contains all the information up to time t. We assume that the information G 1,t , G 2,t available to the retailer and the manufacturer at time t, respectively, are both sub-σ-algebras of F t . Moreover, the information available to them at time t is asymmetric and G 1,t ⊆ G 2,t . This can be explained from the practical application's aspect. Specifically, the manufacturer chooses a wholesale price w(t) at time t, which is a G 2,t -adapted stochastic process. And the retailer chooses an order rate q(t) and a retail price R(t) at time t, which are G 1,t -adapted stochastic processes. For any w(·), to select a G 1,t -adapted process pair (q * (·), Rthere are usually two members, the manufacturer and the retailer. Cooperative advertising is an important instrument for aligning manufacturer and retailer decisions. Specifically, we introduce the following SDE, which is the generalization of Sethi's stochastic salesadvertising model introduced by He et al. [8] :
dx(t) = ρu(t) 1 − x(t) − δx(t) dt + σ(x(t))dW (t) + σ(x(t))d W (t), x(0) = x 0 ∈ [0, 1], where x(t) represents the awareness share, i.e., the number of aware (or informed) customers expressed as a fraction of the total market at time t, ρ is a response constant, and δ determines the rate at which potential consumers are lost. σ(x), σ(x) are functions satisfying usual conditions.
At time t ≥ 0, the manufacturer decides on the wholesale price w(t) and the cooperative participation rate θ(t), and the retailer decides the channel's total advertising effort level u(t) and the retail price p(t). The sequence of the events is as follows. At time t, first, the manufacturer announces his wholesale price w(t) and participation rate θ(t). Second, the retailer sets his retail price p(t) and advertising effort rate u(t) as his optimal response to the manufacturer's announced decisions. The retailer accomplishes this by solving an optimization problem to maximize his expected profit −rt (p(t) − w(t))D(p(t))x(t)
where r > 0 is the discount rate and 0 ≤ D(p) ≤ 1 is the demand function satisfying usual conditions. The manufacturer anticipates the retailer's reaction functions and incorporates them into his optimal control problem, and solves for his wholesale price policy w(t) and the participation rate policy θ(t) at time t. Therefore, the manufacturer's optimization problem is to maximize his expected profit where c ≥ 0 is the constant unit production cost.
Define F t := σ{W (s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t} σ{ W (s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t}.
In the game setting, we assume that the information G 1,t , G 2,t available to the retailer and the manufacturer at time t, respectively, are both sub-σ-algebras of the complete information filtration F t . Moreover, the information available at time t to them is asymmetric and G 1,t ⊆ G 2,t . In detail, the wholesale price w(·) and the participation rate θ(·) of the manufacturer are G 2,tadapted processes. For the retailer, his advertising effort level u(·) and retail price p(·) are to be G 1,t -adapted processes. For any (w(·), θ(·)), first, to select a suitable process pair (u
formulates a leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information. See also [8] for more details about cooperative advertising and pricing models in dynamic stochastic supply chains, where feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is obtained applying dynamic programming approach for stochastic differential game. However, the asymmetric information was not considered there.
Problem Formulation
Inspired by the examples above, we study leader-follower stochastic differential games with asymmetric information in this paper.
Let 0 < T < ∞ be a finite time duration and (Ω, F , P) be a complete probability space. (W (·), W (·)) is a standard R d1+d2 -valued Brownian motion. Let {F t } 0≤t≤T be the natural augmented filtration generated by (W (·), W (·)) and F T = F .
Suppose that the state of the system is described by the
where u 1 (·) and u 2 (·) are control processes taken by the two players in the game, labeled 1 (the follower) and 2 (the leader), with values in nonempty convex sets U 1 ⊆ R m1 , U 2 ⊆ R m2 , respectively. x u1,u2 (·), the solution to SDE (1) with values in R n , is the corresponding state process with initial state x 0 ∈ R n . Here b(t, x, u 1 , u 2 ) :
Let us now explain the asymmetric information feature between the follower (player 1) and the leader (player 2) in this paper. Player 1 is the follower, which means that the information available to him at time t is based on some sub-σ-algebra G 1,t ⊆ G 2,t , where G 2,t is the information available to the leader at time t. We assume in this and next sections that both G 1,t and G 2,t are sub-σ-algebras of the complete information filtration F t . That is, we have G 1,t ⊆ G 2,t ⊆ F t . We define the admissible control sets of the follower and the leader, respectively, as follows.
In the game problem, knowing that the leader has chosen u 2 (·) ∈ U 2 , the follower would like to choose a G 1,tadapted control u * 1 (·) = u * 1 (·; u 2 (·)) to minimize his cost functional
Here
. Now the follower encounters a stochastic optimal control problem with partial information.
Problem of the follower. For any chosen u 2 (·) ∈ U 2 by the leader, choose a G 1,t -adapted control u
In the following procedure of the game problem, once knowing that the follower would take such an optimal control u In this paper, we impose the following assumptions.
(A1.1) For each ω ∈ Ω, the functions b, σ, σ, g 1 are twice continuously differentiable with respect to (x, u 1 , u 2 ). For each ω ∈ Ω, functions g 2 and G 1 , G 2 are continuously differentiable with respect to (x, u 1 , u 2 ) and x, respectively. Moreover, for each ω ∈ Ω and any (t,
, there exists C > 0 such that
for φ = b, σ, σ, and Leader-follower stochastic differential game is the dynamic and stochastic formulation of the well-known Stackelberg game, which was introduced by Stackelberg [18] in 1934, when he defined a concept of a hierarchical solution for markets where some firms have power of domination over others. This solution concept is now known as the Stackelberg equilibrium which, in the context of two-person nonzero-sum games, involves players with asymmetric roles, one leader and one follower. Early study for stochastic Stackelberg differential games can be seen in Basar [3] . In detail, a leader-follower stochastic differential game (or stochastic Stackelberg differential game) proceeds with the follower aims at minimizing his cost functional in accordance with the leader's strategy on the whole duration of the game. Anticipating the follower's optimal response depending on his entire strategy, the leader chooses an optimal one in advance to minimize his own cost functional, based on the stochastic Hamiltonian system satisfied by the follower's optimal response. The pair of the leader's optimal strategy and the follower's optimal response is known as the Stackelberg equilibrium.
To our best knowledge, there are few papers on leaderfollower stochastic differential games. A pioneer work was done by Yong [26] , where a linear-quadratic (LQ) leader-follower stochastic differential game was introduced and studied. In this paper, we initiate to study a leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information, which distinguishes itself from the literatures mentioned above in the following aspects. (i) In our framework, both information filtration available to the leader and the follower could be sub-σ-algebras of the complete information filtration naturally generated by the random noise source. Moreover, the information available to the follower is based on some sub-σ-algebra of that available to the leader. This gives a new explanation for the asymmetric information feature between the follower and the leader, and endows our problem formulation more practical meanings in reality.
(ii) An important class of LQ leader-follower stochastic differential games with asymmetric information is first proposed and then solved. It consists of a stochastic optimal control problem of SDE with partial observation for the follower, and followed by a stochastic optimal control problem of conditional mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) with complete information for the leader. This problem is new in differential game theory and have considerable impacts in both theoretical analysis and practical meaning with future application prospect, although it has intrinsic mathematical difficulties. Note that in [26] , both problems for the follower and leader are to be solved stochastic optimal control problems with complete information.
The open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium of this LQ game problem with asymmetric information, is characterized in terms of the forward-backward stochastic differential filtering equation (FBSDFE), which arises naturally in our setup. To our best knowledge, these FBSDFEs are new in both stochastic control and filtering theory. In particular, they are different from those in Zhang [30] , Huang et al. [9] and Wang and Yu [21] . (iv) State feedback representations for the optimal controls of the follower and the leader, are explicitly given with the help of some new Riccati equations. Both problems for the follower and the leader have mathematical difficulties, and we overcome them via some measure transformation and filtering technique in Xiong [24] , Wang et al. [19] , linear FBSDE decoupling technique in [26] and mean-field FBSDE decoupling technique in Yong [27] , respectively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the problems of the follower and the leader, and then solve them in this order. In Subsection 2.1, we first solve the stochastic optimal control problem with partial information of the follower, applying the theory of controlled SDEs with partial information. The partial information maximum principle and verification theorem are shown. In Subsection 2.2, we then formulate the stochastic optimal control problem of conditional mean-field FBSDE with partial information of the leader, regarding the stochastic Hamiltonian system corresponding to the follower's optimal response as his state equation. Via controlled conditional meanfield FBSDEs, the maximum principle and verification theorem with partial information are both given. In Section 3, we apply our theoretical results to an LQ leaderfollower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information. Specifically, Subsection 3.1 is devoted to the solution of an LQ stochastic optimal control problem with partial observation of the follower. The key technique is to get some observable optimal controls by explicitly computing the optimal filtering estimates of the corresponding adjoint processes, when applying the maximum principle approach and measure transformation. The state feedback form of the observable optimal control for the follower is then represented by some symmetric Riccati equation under appropriate assumptions. Here, the state of the follower is represented by some FB-SDFE. Subsection 3.2 is devoted to the solution of an LQ stochastic optimal control problem of conditional meanfield FBSDE with complete information of the leader. The state feedback representation of optimal control is derived. Since the filtering estimates of the original state and the control of the leader are involved in its state equation, we encounter difficulty. We overcome this difficulty by applying the maximum principle and verification theorem for conditional mean-field FBSDEs, via the solution to some adjoint conditional mean-field FB-SDE. The state feedback representation for the optimal control of the leader (together with the optimal control of the follower) is obtained via some new system of Riccati equations in the double dimensional spaces, when the dimensional augmentation by Yong [26] is applied. Thus, the state feedback representation of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium can be given. Finally, Section 4 gives some concluding remarks.
2 Maximum Principle and Verification Theorem for Stackelberg Equilibrium
The Follower's Problem
In this subsection, we first solve the partial information stochastic optimal control problem of the follower, that is Problem of the follower.
For any chosen u 2 (·) ∈ U 2 , suppose that there exists an optimal control u * 1 (·) for the follower, and the corresponding optimal state x u * 1 ,u2 (·) is the solution to (1) .
uniquely solves the adjoint BSDE of the follower
⊤ , and similar notations will be used.
Define the Hamiltonian function of the follower
Similar to [21] , we have the following results.
Proposition 2.1 (Partial Information Maximum
Principle) Suppose that (A1.1) holds. For any given u 2 (·) ∈ U 2 , let u * 1 (·) be the optimal control for Problem of the follower, and x u * 1 ,u2 (·) be the corresponding optimal state. Let (q(·), k(·), k(·)) be the adjoint process triple. Then we have
holds, for any u 1 ∈ U 1 .
Proposition 2.2 (Partial Information Verification Theorem)
Suppose that (A1.1) holds. For any given u 2 (·), let u * 1 (·) ∈ U 1 and x u * 1 ,u2 (·) be the corresponding state. Let (q(·), k(t), k(·)) be the adjoint process triple. Moreover, for each (t, ω)
holds for a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], a.s. Then u * 1 (·) is an optimal control for Problem of the follower.
The Leader's Problem
In this subsection, we first state the partial information stochastic optimal control problem of the leader in detail, that is Problem of the leader. Then we give the maximum principle and verification theorem for it.
For any u 2 (·) ∈ U 2 , by the maximum condition (10), we assume that a functional u *
is uniquely defined, where
For the simplicity of notations, we denote
for φ = b, σ, σ, g 1 , respectively. Then after substituting the above control process u * 1 (·) into the follower's adjoint equation (8), the leader encounters the controlled FBSDE system
Note that (13) is a controlled conditional mean-field FB-SDE, which now is regarded as the "state" equation of the leader. That is to say, the state for the leader is the quadruple (
does not hold in general. However, for LQ case, it is satisfied and we will make this point clear in the next section.
where g
Note the cost functional of the leader is also conditional mean-field's type. We propose the stochastic optimal control problem with partial information of the leader as follows.
subject to (13) and (14) . Such a u * 2 (·) is called a (partial information) optimal control, and the corresponding solution (13) is called a (partial information) optimal state process for the leader.
Suppose that there exists an optimal control u * 2 (·) for the leader, and the corresponding state (x
is the solution to (13) . Define the Hamiltonian function of the leader
be the unique F t -adapted solution to the adjoint conditional mean-field FBSDE of the leader 
Proof. The maximum condition (18) can be derived by convex variation and adjoint technique, as Anderson and Djehiche [2] . We omit the details for saving space. See also Li [13] , Yong [27] and the references therein for mean-field stochastic optimal control problems. ✷ Proposition 2.4 (Verification theorem of conditional mean-field FBSDE with partial information) Suppose that (A1.1) holds. Let u *
n . Let (y(·), z(·), z(·), p(·)) be the adjoint quadruple. For each (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω, suppose that H 2 t, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·; y(t), z(t), z(t), p(t) and G 2 (·) are convex, and
holds for a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], a.s. Then u * 2 (·) is an optimal control for Problem of the leader.
Proof. This follows similar to Shi [16] . We omit the details for simplicity. ✷ Remark 2.3 In some applications, for example, the principle-agent problems, the opposite inclusion G 1,t ⊇ G 2,t or more complicated relations between them may hold. The study of the leader-follower game in such cases is similar to the one which we studied in this paper. We omit them to limit the length of the paper.
LQ Leader-Follower Stochastic Differential
Game with Asymmetric Information
In order to illustrate the theoretical results in Section 2, we study an LQ leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information. For notational simplicity, we consider
This game is a partially observed model which is a special case of the one in Section 2, but the resulting deduction is technically demanding. We split this section into two subsections, to deal with the problems of the follower and the leader, respectively.
The Follower's LQ Problem
Suppose that the state (x u1,u2 (·), x(·)) ∈ R n × R n of the system is described by the linear SDE 
n×m2 are deterministic, bounded matrix-valued or vector-valued functions, and x 0 , x 0 ∈ R n .
Suppose that the state (x u1,u2 (·), x(·)) cannot be directly observed by the follower. Instead, he can observe a re-lated process Y (·) ∈ R which is governed by the SDE
Inserting (21) into (20), we have
Let us now introduce an R-valued process
which is the solution to the SDE
It is obvious that Z(·) is a ((F t ) 0≤t≤T , P)-martingale, since the Novikov condition holds:
(see Example 3, Section 6.2, Liptser and Shiryayev [14] ). We thus can define a new probability measure P such that for any t, d P = Z(t)dP, on F t . By Girsanov's theorem and (21), (W (·), Y (·)) is a 2-dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on (Ω, F , (F t ) 0≤t≤T , P).
In this section, we denote F t ≡ F 
Here Q 1 (·) ∈ S n , N 1 (·) ∈ S m1 are deterministic and bounded matrix-valued functions, and G 1 ∈ S n . We introduce the following assumption.
The admissible control set U 1 for the follower is defined as (2) in Section 1, for G 1,t = F Y t in this section. And we will denote the above as LQ Problem of the follower.
We apply the maximum principle approach in Subsection 2.1 to solve this partially observed stochastic optimal control problem of the follower. In the following, we will split the process of finding observable optimal control u * 1 (·) for the follower into three steps.
Step 1. (Optimal control) First, we put the above problem into the filtered probability space (Ω, F , {F W,Y t } 0≤t≤T , P), in order to apply Propositions 2.1 and 2.2. By (21) and (24), we obtain
(26) Moreover, we have
that is,
By Bayes' formula (Theorem 3.22, Xiong [24] ), we have
where E is the mathematical expectation with respect to P. The Hamiltonian function (9) of the follower, now takes the form
and the adjoint equation (8) writes
For given u 2 (·), suppose that there exists an F Y t -adapted optimal control u * 1 (·) ∈ U 1 for the follower, and the corresponding optimal state x u * 1 ,u2 (·) is the solution to (22) , that is,
where x(·) ∈ R n can be solved from the second equation of (22) , since it is a process which is not controlled.
Then (30) together with Proposition 2.1 yields that,
with
Step 2. (Optimal filtering) Next, noting that the terminal condition of (31), it is natural to set
for some deterministic and differentiable S n -matrix valued function P 1 (·), and
In the above, α(·) ∈ R n is F W,Y t -adapted and β(·) ∈ R n is F Y t -adapted process, which will be determined later. Now, applying Itô's formula to (34), we have
(36) Comparing the {·}dW (t), {·}dY (t) and {·}dt terms of (36) with those of the adjoint equation (31), we arrive at
and
respectively. By Bayes' formula, noting (34), we havê
Similarly, by (37) we get
Applying Lemma 5.4 in Xiong [24] to the state equation (32) of the follower, we derive the filtering equation Step 3. (Optimal state feedback control) By (33), (40) and (41), in order to obtain state feedback form of the follower's optimal control, the remaining task is to give the representation ofẐ(t) := E[Z(t)|F Y t ], since by Bayes' formula, we have
Applying Theorem 8.1 of [14] to (24) and (21), we have
where dˆ W (t) :
By (33), and supposing that
we immediately arrive at
for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], where we denote
Substituting (45) into (39), we can obtain that if the ordinary differential equation
where
And the BSDE (35) takes the form
We rewrite (46) as the following
which is similar to the classical Riccati equation (6.6), Chapter 6 in Yong and Zhou [28] , or (5.2) in [26] . Thus its solvability can be guaranteed.
For givenû 2 (·), plugging the optimal control u * 1 (·) of (45) into (42), we have
which admits a unique F Y t -adapted solutionx u * 1 ,û2 (·), where we denote
Applying Lemma 5.4 in Xiong [24] to (48), we have
Putting (50) and (51) together, we get
Note that (52) is an FBSDFE, whose solvability can be easily obtained, for given u 2 (·).
Moreover, we can easily check that the convexity/concavity conditions are satisfied. Then by Proposition 2.2, u * 1 (·) by (45) is really optimal.
We summarize the above in the following theorem. -adapted process ϕ(·) in (34) which satisfies the BSDE (35). This is different from [28] but similar to [26] . More importantly, we will see in next subsection that (48) can be regarded as the new backward "state" equation of the leader. (52) is an FBSDE system, the value (x
Remark 3.2 Noting that
This means that u * 1 (·) is generally anticipating. Thus, it is important to find a "real" state feedback representation for u * 1 (·) in terms of the original state x u * 1 ,u2 (·). This work will be done in the end of this section via the dimensional augmentation introduced by Yong [26] , together with the optimal control u * 2 (·) for the leader.
The Leader's LQ Problem
Now, we are ready to study the stochastic optimal control problem of the leader. Knowing that the follower would take his optimal control u *
where we denote
1 ,û2 (·) for simplicity and
(t) S(t).
The leader would like to choose an F t -adapted optimal control u * 2 (·) such that his cost functional
is minimized, where Q 2 (·) ∈ S n , N 2 (·) ∈ S m2 are deterministic, bounded matrix-valued functions, and G 2 ∈ S n . We introduce the following assumption.
The admissible control set U 2 of the leader is defined as
As mentioned in Remark 3.1, the leader has to include the process pair (ϕ(·), β(·)) as part of his new state processes, sinceφ(·) is involved in the coefficients of (53). Thus for any u 2 (·), the state equation of the leader is
which is a conditional mean-field FBSDE. Its solvability for F t -adapted solution (x u2 (·), ϕ(·), β(·)) can be easily guaranteed (since the solvability of FBSDFE (52) for (x u2 (·),φ(·), β(·)) has been obtained). And we will denote the above as LQ Problem of the leader.
We apply the maximum principle approach in Section 2.2 to solve LQ Problem of the leader, which now is a complete information one since G 2,t ≡ F t . We split this process into three steps.
Step 1. (Optimal control)
Since the process triple (q(·), k(·), k(·)) has been replaced by the new pair (ϕ(·), β(·)), we define the Hamiltonian function H 2 as
(56) And the adjoint equation (17) writes
and (p(·), y(·), z(·)) ∈ R n × R n × R n being F t -adapted processes. Note that (57) is an FBSDE.
Suppose that there exists an F t -adapted optimal control u * 2 (·) ∈ U 2 for the leader, and the corresponding optimal state (x
(58) Then (56) together with Proposition 2.3 yields that
Moreover, we can easily check that the convexity condition is satisfied. Then by Proposition 2.4, u * 2 (·) defined by (59) is really optimal.
Step 2. (State feedback representation) The representation of u * 2 (·) through (59) is not satisfactory. We expect to obtain its state feedback representation via some Riccati equations. For this target, let us regard the (x * (·), p(·)) ⊤ as the optimal state and put
and (suppressing some t below)
Then (58) with (57) is equivalent to the following conditional mean-field FBSDE
Supposing that
then from (59), for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], we have
(64) Putting (63), (64) into (61), and letting
⊤ ,
Up to now, we have every reason to suppose that Φ(t) = P 1 (t)X(t) + P 2 (t)X(t) + P 3 (t),
due to the terminal condition in (65), where P 1 (·), P 2 (·) are both differentiable, deterministic S 2n -valued functions with P 1 (T ) = G 2 , P 2 (T ) = 0, and F W,Y t -adapted process P 3 (·) satisfies BSDE
In the above, λ(·) ∈ R 2n is F W,Y t -adapted and Q 3 (·) ∈ R 2n is F Y t -adapted, which will be determined later.
Our remaining task is to decouple the conditional meanfield FBSDE (65), by (66) and (67). This will lead to a derivation of our system of Riccati equations for
First, by (65) and (21), we have
(68) Noting that
then applying Lemma 5.4 of [24] to (68), we get
Also, by the backward equation of (65), we have (69) and (70), we obtain dΦ(t) =Ṗ 1 (t)X(t)dt + P 1 (t)dX(t) +Ṗ 2 (t)X(t)dt + P 2 (t)dX(t) + dP 3 (t)
Comparing the coefficients of {·}dW (t) and {·}dY (t) on both sides of the last " = " of (71), we have
Taking the conditional expectation E[·|F 
exists, we havê 
we have
Comparing the coefficients of {·}dt in (71) and substituting (73), (74), (75) into it, we obtain the following coupled system of Riccati equations
(77) Applying Lemma 5.4 in Xiong [24] to (67), we have
(78) Noting that the above filtered BSDE (78) satisfies the stochastic Lipschitz condition in Wang et al. [22] , then it admits a unique F Y t -adapted solution (P 3 (·), Q 3 (·)). Thus the BSDE (67) admits a unique F
Note that the system of Riccati equations (76) is entirely new. For its solvability, we first rewrite the first equation for P 1 (·) as follows
(79) Note that
is symmetric (which can be proved by multiplying both sides by 
for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], where
Step 3. (Optimal state equation)
By (66), (73), (74), (75), we have decoupled the optimality system (65). And the optimal "state"
whereX(·) satisfies the filtered SDE We summarize the above in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose that assumptions (A3.1)∼ (A3.6) hold and the system of Riccati equations (76) admits a differentiable solution pair (P 1 (·), P 2 (·)). Let X(·) be the F -adapted solution to (67). Moreover, the state feedback control u * 2 (·) defined by (80) is an optimal control for Problem of the leader.
Noting that the optimal control u * 2 (·) for the leader given by (80) is nonanticipating. Likewise, for the follower, the optimal control u * 1 (t) ≡ u * 1 t;x * (t),û * 2 (t),φ * (t), β * (t) can also be represented in a nonanticipating way. In fact, by (45), noting (64), (66), (74) 
for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], which is an observable state feedback representation for the optimal control of the follower, whereX(·) satisfies (82) and (P 3 (·), Q 3 (·)) satisfies (78).
Up to now, we have solved our LQ leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information, and it admits an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium (u * 1 (·), u * 2 (·)). Its state feedback representation is (83) and (80), respectively. And the corresponding optimal state equation of the leader is (81), the corresponding optimal state (observable) equation of the follower is (82).
Remark 3.4 When we consider the complete information case, i.e., W (·) disappears and G 1,t = F t , Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 coincide with Theorems 2.3 and 3.3 in [26] .
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have discussed a leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information, or named a stochastic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric information. This kind of game problem possesses several attractive features worthy of being highlighted. First, the game problem has the Stackelberg or leader-follower feature, which means the two players act as different roles during the game. Thus the usual approach to deal with game problems, such as Yong [25] , Hamadène [7] , Wu [23] , An and Øksendal [1] , Wang and Yu [21] , Yu [29] , Hui and Xiao [10, 11] , Shi [17] where the two players act as equivalent roles, does not apply. Second, the game problem has the asymmetric information between the two players, which was not considered in Yong [26] , Øksendal et al. [15] and Bensoussan et al. [5] . In detail, the information available to the follower is based on some sub-σ-algebra of that available to the leader. Stochastic filtering technique is introduced to compute the optimal filtering estimates for the corresponding adjoint processes, which perform as the solution to some FBSDFE. Third, the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is represented in its state feedback form for the partial observation case of LQ problem, under some appropriate assumptions on the coefficient matrices in the state equation and the cost functionals. Some new conditional mean-field FBSDEs and system of Riccati equations are first introduced in this paper, to deal with the leader's LQ problem.
Note that in principle, Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 provide a useful tool to seek open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. As a first step in this direction, we apply our results to LQ models to obtain explicit solutions. We hope to return to the more general case when the states are not linear or the costs are not quadratic in our future research to completely solve the problems in the motivating examples introduced in the introduction. We expect that explicit solutions will not be available for these examples and numerical approximations will be studied. It is worthy to study the closed-loop Stackelberg equilibrium for our problem, as well as the solvability of the system of Riccati equations (76). In addition, many more partially observable cases which are more important and reasonable for applications and technological demanding in its filtering procedure, are highly desirable for further research. These challenging topics will be considered in our future work.
